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Abstract
String theory is accused by some of its critics to be a purely ab-
stract mathematical discipline, having lost the contact to the simple
yet deeply rooted questions which physics provided until the beginning
of this century. We argue that, in contrary, there are indications that
string theory might be linked to a fundamental principle of a quantum
computational character. In addition, the nature of this principle can
possibly provide some new insight into the question of universality of
string theory (string theory as the “theory of everything”).
1 Universality
String theory is often also named the “theory of everything” since it is sup-
posed to explain all the fundamental forces and all the elementary particles
of nature, including the gravitational force which - as we know from Ein-
stein’s theory of general relativity - is intimately linked to the structure of
space-time. But could it not be possible that the story goes on after string
theory that we would discover e.g. additional new forces of nature which it
does not explain? After all, even the early 20th century believed that elec-
tromagnetism and gravity are the only fundamental forces, the discovery of
the weak and strong forces came only later since their presence is basically
restricted to the level of elementary particles. This question is usually an-
swered by refering to the Planck length. The weak and strong forces were
discovered by investigating smaller distance scales than before but a quantum
1
theory of gravity is supposed to provide a smallest length scale in the order
of the Planck length and string theory is assumed to be valid down to this
scale. Indeed, there are strong arguments that string theory involves such
a minimum length, shorter length scales being physically non observable in
the same sense as the Heisenberg uncertainty relation shows classical phase
space coordinates to be non observable beyond a certain precision (There is
a large body of work on this topic in string theory. In order to keep the
list of references of this short letter restricted, we refer to [Pol] as a general
reference for string theory and cite only individual research papers on very
special topics not included there.). If we would have a theory which applies
down to the Planck scale and if shorter length scales are physically unobserv-
able, it seems that we would really have a final physical theory. A critic who
is acquainted with string theory could try to find a loop hole in this argu-
ment by pointing out that string theorists themselves believe that the - yet
to be discovered - fundamental formulation of the theory might not refer to
space-time at all. So, maybe it is simply wrong to assume that gaining new
knowledge will necessarily be linked to the necessity to increase space-time
precision of measurements. Maybe a full fledged string theory would itself
tell us how to pose the right questions ultimately leading beyond itself.
At this point, we should remember Bohr’s discussion of measurement in
quantum mechanics which in its basic ideas is applicable to any physical
theory, including string theory. The starting point of the argument is that it
does not make any sense to try to discuss the question what “physics is really
like”. We have to be content with investigating how physics which physicists
can know about is like. But irrespective of how ingenious and inventive
experimental physicists and high tech engineers will be in the future, any
experiment will ultimately have to include some measuring device which -
for the purpose of the experiment under consideration - can be supposed to
work according to the laws of classical mechanics. The finger pointing to the
value of some measured quantity on a scale has to work as a classical device.
If you would observe it in e.g. funny quantum superpositions, you would
simply not be able to communicate about the results of the experiments
with a colleague or to give a conference report about these. So, ultimately
higher precision of an experiment has to transform into higher precision of a
classical measuring device but, simply because it is a classical device, higher
precision means higher precision in the space-time coordinates (e.g. of the
finger on the scale). Of course, we can use different scales . We can observe
the same effect on a, in total, smaller or larger scale but this is simply a
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rescaling. It does not prevent from the conclusion that if there is a limit to
the increase of space-time precision, there is a limit to the precision of any
kind of experiment which human physicists can perform.
So, the conviction that string theory is universal, in the sense that it
is not itself the limiting case of yet another more fundamental theory to
be dicovered one day by experiments of some very high precision, does not
derive from lack of fantasy to imagine e.g. some new exotic forces of nature
but from some very fundamental limits.
Can we really gain universal knowledge, even in principle? Of course, in
practice string theory will not provide you with the possibility to calculate
your success in the stock markets in advance. Since it adheres to the laws of
quantum mechanics, string theory has even intrinsic bounds on the knowledge
one can gain from it. But accepting the limits of Heisenberg’s uncertainty
relation and of practical calculations, the idea of having one day the final
physical theory in our hands causes admiration and unease at the same time.
And it is not the purely melancholic kind of unease (“the story is finally
over, then”) which arises, here, but an unease which is fostered by one of the
deepest insights the 20th century has provided us with.
Since Go¨del presented his incompleteness theorems, we know that univer-
sality can require a price to pay. Hilbert’s program of building mathematics
on formal axiomatics and proving that the used axiom systems are free of
contradictions, then, would - if successful - also have given mathematics a
final form. Indeed, in spite of Go¨del’s results, mathematics has found a base
in the 20th century in the form of axiomatic set theory which has proved
to be universal so far in the sense that any presently known field of math-
ematics can - in principle (again, this is often not the most useful view in
mathematical practice) - be boiled down to constructions in this theory. The
price Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems require us to pay for this is the never
ending richness of models (in the sense of model theory of formal axiomatic
systems) which axiomatic set theory has (and which - just by Go¨del’s re-
sults - no formal axiomatic theory whatever can come to terms with). It is
the feeling that the Go¨del results tell us a lesson about universality which
goes beyond their concrete form as a result about formal axiomatic theories
which causes the deeper form of unease one experiences when talking about
the final physical theory.
Comparing to Go¨del’s results in formal mathematics, we expect that the
final physical theory, the “theory of everything”, comes along with an in-
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exhaustible plentitude of models (here, we use the term “inexhaustible” to
stress that we do not simply mean infinitely many models but also that they
can not be described in a single closed form). This expectation is not in
contradiction to the limits on observations we discussed above. Our discus-
sion of physical measurements above applies only to local properties. Strictly
speaking, the conclusion we can draw from it is that for any given physical
system (of limited volume) there is a final description upon which we can not
improve any more by increasing the precision of measurements. The possi-
bility that different local physical systems are described by different models
of the “theory of everything” and that there is an inexhaustible plentitude
of such models can not be excluded a priori. We will discuss this point in
more detail at the end of the next section.
Some warnings aiming at possible misunderstandings are in order, here.
Since we required that the models of the final theory can not be described
in a single closed form, we can not identify these with the usual initial con-
ditions of a physical theory. Also, we can not identify the models with the
different possibilities for Calabi-Yau compactification which arise in string
theory. The full background independent formulation of string theory one
hopes to discover should live on the full moduli space and therefore is not
supposed to be parametrized by different Calabi-Yau manifolds. How should
the different models arise, then? We will meet a natural candidate for the
price one has to pay for the universality of the “theory of everything” in the
next section.
2 Is string theory quantum computational?
Recent research has lead to the following two - partly conjectural - scenarios:
• The tangential structure of the moduli space (to be more precise, the
so called extended moduli space) of string theory at a Calabi-Yau man-
ifold W is described by the total Hochschild complex of the sheaf of
holomorphic functions on W ([Kon 1994], [Wit]).
• The possible deformation quantizations of a smooth finite dimensional
manifold M constitute an infinite dimensional manifold DM and the
Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group acts transitively on DM ([Kon 1999]).
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At first sight, the two points may appear as completely unrelated. But
the second one is deeply tied to the Deligne conjecture (a proof of which is
announced in [Kon 1999]) which states that the operad of chains of the little
discs operad naturally acts on the total Hochschild complex of any associative
algebra (and using a deep result of cohomology theory, the so called Cohomol-
ogy Comparison Theorem of [GeSch], therefore also on the total Hochschild
complex of any sheaf of associative algebras). Now, the automorphism group
of the operad of chains of the little discs operad is - at least in considera-
tions up to homotopy - the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group. The generality
of the Deligne conjecture suggests, then, that the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller
group might also describe a fundamental symmetry of the (extended) mduli
space of string theory. We present a more detailed discussion of these is-
sues elsewhere and for our present purpose restrict to the remark that the
idea that the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group could represent some funda-
mental symmetry of string theory gets further support from the fact that
the Kontsevich formula for the deformation quantization of a finite dimen-
sional Poisson manifold M can be derived from a two dimensional conformal
field theory with target space M (see [CF], [Kon 1997]). The weights of the
Feynman graphs of this two dimensional quantum field theory belong to a
subalgebra PZ,Tate of the algebra P of periods (the notation indicating that
it is the algebra of periods of certain mixed Tate motives). Again, it is con-
jectured ([Kon 1999]) that - roughly speaking - the symmetries of PZ,Tate are
described by the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group (much the same way as the
symmetries of the algebraic numbers Q are described by the absolute Galois
group Gal
(
Q/Q
)
).
The reader who is not acquainted with part of the technical notions used
above should at least keep in mind the following two points for the discussion
in the rest of this section:
• There is an algebra PZ,Tate ⊆ C over Q which is conjectured to de-
termine the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group which in turn might be a
fundamental symmetry of string theory.
• The elements of PZ,Tate appear (as the weights of Feynman graphs) in
the deformation quantization of any finite dimensional Poisson mani-
fold.
Let us speculatively suppose for the rest of this paper that the Grothendieck-
Teichmu¨ller group is a fundamental symmetry of string theory. We could then
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- in a still more optimistic vein - hope that - as in the case of other physical
theories, e.g. general relativity - the symmetry is linked to a basic princi-
ple which largely determines the theory. Is there a candidate for a physical
principle which determines the algebra PZ,Tate?
Let us try to give an answer by posing a seemingly quite different ques-
tion: What is the physically natural choice for an algebra of numbers? Since
a computer is a physical device, certainly all numbers which have a real-
ization on a computer have to be considered as physical. The rationals Q
can be realized on computers and since the operations of arithmetic have a
realization, it is clear that the set of “physical numbers” has to be an algebra
over Q. For a classical Turing machine (the model of a universal computer),
Q is already the maximal set of numbers we can obtain. Even a simple non
rational algebraic number like
√
2 has no intrinsic realization on a Turing
machine. Since we know that nature is not classical but quantum mechani-
cal, we should actually not consider classical Turing machines but quantum
computers. The rationals can, of course, be realized there, too, and at first
sight it seems that this is the final answer, again. Concerning the question
of principal computability, quantum computers are equivalent to classical
Turing machines, they only differ from them with respect to computational
complexity of problems (see [Deu]). But the Kontsevich quantization formula
shows that there is a set of numbers - which is precisely given by the algebra
PZ,Tate - which is intrinsically defined for any deformation quantization of
a Poisson manifold (finite dimensional). So, if we assume a quantum com-
puter to be described by deformation quantization of some classical model,
for a quantum computer PZ,Tate should be the algebra of numbers which are
physically defined (Of course, assuming that there is a model for quantum
computation which can be described in terms of deformation quantization is
a true - i.e. non trivial - assumption which we will make in the sequel. It
is closely related to assuming that quantum computation can be described
by a low dimensional quantum field theory, cf. the work of [FLW]). Why is
there no contradiction to the results of [Deu], here? The answer is that in
the quantum computer only the rationals can naturally be realized, as in the
case of the classical Turing machine. The way the periods in PZ,Tate arise in
the process of quantization - as weights of Feynman graphs - shows that they
should be viewed as being linked to a kind of scattering theory done on the
system under consideration. Scattering theory means testing the long time
behaviour of a system under possible input data. So, we expect that the
numbers in PZ,Tate become only observable as intrinsic numbers of a quan-
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tum computer when one tests the long term behaviour of the device with
all possible kinds of input data. Then they should emerge from the statis-
tics of these tests. Formulated in a down to earth way, one could say that
the numbers in PZ,Tate should emerge as statistical coefficients from quantum
software testing (there are no intrinsic coefficients of this kind in the classical
case). In the language of formal logic these coefficients belong to the meta
level (since they refer to testing the device from the outside) and not to the
system itself. This is the reason why there is no contradiction to [Deu]. But
testing a device is in every respect an allowed physical procedure, too. So, a
quantum computer should give the much larger algebra PZ,Tate as the algebra
of physically realized numbers.
In conclusion, let us suggest the following physical principle for determin-
ing the algebra PZ,Tate:
1. All physical systems should be amenable to a real time simulation
on a quantum computer and quantum computers should be described
as physical systems by deformation quantization of classical Turing
machines.
2. The observable quantities of the world should be those which can be
determined by observation of quantum computers on quantum com-
puters.
The first part of this principle is quite close to a quantum version of the
Church-Turing hypothesis as discussed in [Deu]. The real time simulation
of quantum systems on a quantum computer is possible for systems with a
finite dimensional quantum state space (i.e. for spin systems). The Beken-
stein bound on the entropy of systems of finite volume suggests that on a
fundamental level local physics should always be describable by systems with
finite dimensional quantum state spaces. There are indications that this is
true for string theory (see [Sus]). We added the requirement that a quan-
tum computer is described by deformation quantization of a classical Turing
machine because this is, of course, decisive for our arguments.
Part (1) of the principle means that we can in our mind replace the whole
world by a world consisting of quantum computers, only, without changing
the physical properties. The assumption of part (2) is quite natural, then.
It means that we should take this world of quantum computers at face value
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and should consider only what quantum computers can determine internally
and externally (about each other) as physically observable.
Part (1) leads - as discussed above - to the algebra PZ,Tate. What is
the effect of part (2)? We discussed the testing of quantum software as if
done by a classical agent. Part (2) would require to do the testing by a
quantum computer, too. But then the classical weights would have to be
replaced by operators themselves and, in effect, we would expect an algebra
of quantum periods and a q-deformation of the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller
group (instead of PZ,Tate and the classical Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group)
to arise as the fundamental symmetry objects. The (extended) moduli space
of string theory, we discussed at the beginning of this section, is a space of
classical backgrounds for string theory (this is like considering the Ricci flat
metrics as backgrounds for perturbation expansions in general relativity).
The full quantum theory will have to include non classical backgrounds, too.
We are not going more deeply into this question, here, but it will be discussed
in a forthcoming separate publication where we will give technical arguments
why one should, indeed, expect the inclusion of non classical backgrounds to
lead to quantum deformations of PZ,Tate and the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller
group.
But part (2) of the suggested principle has even more radical conse-
quences. We can, in principle, imagine a quantum computer testing a quan-
tum computer, at the same time being tested itself by yet another quantum
computer, and even an iteration of this process. We would therefore have to
deal with iterative deformation quantization of the mathematical structures
resulting in each step. On the side of string theory this would mean that full
quantized string theory would itself be only one step on a ladder of infinite
quantization, an idea which has been uttered in the literature some years ago
([Gre]).
At this point we come back to the question of universality of string theory,
discussed in the previous section. The above principle leads us to the conclu-
sion that string theory is universal in the sense that the classical theory we
have to start from is universal (represented on the mathematical side by the
algebra PZ,Tate and the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group). On the other hand,
there is the ladder of quantizations (on the mathematical side represented by
iterated quantum deformations of classical mathematical structures). This
ladder is comparable to the plentitude of models of a formal axiomatic theory
since it means that there is a whole hierarchy of different “quantum realiza-
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tions” of the universal classical theory. This seems to be the price one has to
pay for universality (comparable to the price formal axiomatics has to pay
as a consequence of Go¨del’s incompleteness results).
Remark 1 One could try to find a loop hole in our arguments in the follow-
ing way: When we argue that the observation of a quantum computer by a
quantum computer could be observed by a third one and that this should start
a ladder of quantizations, one could argue that one should actually describe
the first two computers as a single quantum system observed by the third
one. But this is only true if we neglect interactions or if interactions are
described approximately in a way (like by a Coulomb law) which still allows
for the application of the rules of simple quantum mechanics. We know that
on a more fundamental level interactions have to be described by quantum
field theories and then a ladder of quantizations arises (as we all know from
second quantization). One should keep in mind that the “testing of quantum
software” necessarily introduces a decisive interaction - without which the
full algebra PZ,Tate would not be observable - between the devices. A short but
intriguing discussion how the introduction of interactions starts the ladder of
quantizations can be found in the introductory chapter of the first volume of
[GSW].
Remark 2 We mentioned an iterative application of q-deformation, above.
For a concrete example - a quantum deformation of quantum groups - the
reader may consult [GS].
When discussing physical measurements in the previous section, we re-
marked already that the different models - i.e. the different levels of quantiza-
tion - of the “theory of everything” can only be realized in terms of different
local physical systems. Observing a higher level of quantization means that
we have to have the possibility to observe a tower of ever smaller (quantum)
effects on a system. Let us recall once again that the limit to this we found
in the previous section does apply only to every single system. It does not
exclude the possibility that we can observe a level of quantization which is
non observable for one system by going to another one. A system which
allows for the observation of a larger part of the hierarchy of quantizations
has to be capable to provide more information. Since this information can
not be gained - as we have seen in the previous section - by increasing the
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accuracy of position measurements, there is only one possibility to provide
this information: The system has to be more complex. We therefore conclude
that if the hierarchy of quantizations is observable it has to correspond to a
hierarchy of complexity. The different models of the universal theory should
correspond to different levels of complexity of physical systems.
The above principle and the work of [Gre] suggest - if one asks for the
observability of the ladder of quantizations - the following view on string
theory: The universality of the classical theory seems to reflect the fact
that it is a theory of all the fundamental forces and particles (and thus the
constituents of all kinds of matter), i.e. a “theory of everything”. But it does
not seem to be a reductionist theory in the strict sense since there seems to
be a hierarchy of complexity corresponding to different levels of quantization.
For each level of complexity there would be a limit on the information we can
obtain from the system, i.e. we could observe the level of quantization up to
an n-th one but the k-th level for k ≥ n would be physically unobservable.
One suspects that on the level of elementary particle physics it is just the
usual quantization of a physical theory which is observable with all the rest
of the ladder being non observable.
Remark 3 We can not circumvent the levels of complexity by arguing that
the system just consists of elementary constituents. It is not a priori clear
that we can completely break apart the system in this way. In a theory in-
volving a ladder of quantizations there is no a priori rule which tells us that
we have to apply the same level of quantization to the composed system as to
the constituents. We expect that when a system becomes complex enough to
do an amount of “quantum software testing” which makes the algebra PZ,Tate
observable to it, the critical point for the next level of complexity (or quanti-
zation) is reached.
Concluding this section, we mention once again that interactions (the
“quantum software testing”) are inextricably linked to each passage to the
next higher level of quantization. In a theory following the suggested prin-
ciple, a “cat”, belonging to a level of complexity which is at least one step
higher than the one of elementary particles and atoms, could therefore never
become a “Schro¨dinger’s cat” by an experiment triggered by radioactive de-
cay (following the rules of quantum mechanics, it is not decisive for the “cat”
actually to do “quantum software testing” on atoms but what matters is only
the possibility that it is, by information capacity, able to do it).
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3 Conclusion
We have seen that there are strong arguments that string theory should have
the property of being the final physical theory but there may be a price
for this universality to pay in the form of a ladder of quantizations (corre-
sponding to a hierarchy of complexity). A possible fundamental symmetry
of string theory and the ladder of quantizations may both be consequences of
an underlying principle with a natural quantum computational formulation.
A paper dealing with some of the more technical aspects, mentioned only
shortly, here, will appear separately.
If the picture presented in this paper has anything to do with the true
nature of string theory, string theory would be both, an end and a beginning.
Since the days of antiquity human scientists and philosophers have asked
questions about space, time, and the ultimate constituents of matter. String
theory would be the final word about this, the end of a long journey of
investigation. But at the same time, it would be a new beginning, the starting
point of a physics asking questions about a quantum hierarchy of complexity
and about properties of quantum computation.
We have formulated our suggested principle in the language of quan-
tum computers because with quantum mechanics having become one of the
standard parts of modern mathematical physics, this should be an especially
intelligible form. But beyond the questions discussed in this article, the work
of Kontsevich (in [Kon 1997], [Kon 1999]) could - in an optimistic vein, once
again - turn out to be the starting point for a new understanding of quan-
tization, itself. The decisive question is if the universal infinite dimensional
manifold DM of deformation quantizations of a finite dimensional manifold
M , as discussed in [Kon 1999], can be determined by knowing that it is
a principal homogenous space of the Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group plus
some natural principles. Put into different words: The question is if the
Grothendieck-Teichmu¨ller group (and therefore - under the assumption of a
conjecture of [Kon 1999] - the algebra PZ,Tate) does - modulo some natural
principles - already determine what deformation quantization is. If the an-
swer to this question would be in the affirmative, this would mean that quan-
tization itself would be largely determined by two simple yet deep principles.
In the rest of this appendix we will explain this idea in more detail, assuming
speculatively, again, that the answer to the above questions is indeed in the
affirmative (i.e. the important step remaining would be to determine the
algebra PZ,Tate, again).
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We state the first of the two principles as:
Principle 1:
The physically relevant information of a state space of a physical theory
is fully contained in a suitable algebra of real valued functions (observables)
on state space and the deformation theory of this algebra.
The first part of this principle - physically relevant information is con-
tained in the algebra of observables on state space - is definitely true for
all the well established theories in physics. The second part - the inclusion
of the deformation theory of the algebra - can, of course, be justified on
abstract grounds: Why should a highly idealized mathematical structure -
like some algebra - be exactly applicable to physics? One would expect that
algebras which are in some sense close to the original one should also be of
relevance, then. But this means precisely the consideration of deformation
theory of algebras. In string theory we indeed consider the moduli space
of two dimensional conformal quantum field theories as the space of physi-
cally allowed classical backgrounds of the theory. So, this principle is just a
destilation of the structural core we anyway accept for physical theories.
Let us come to the second principle, now:
Principle 2
The physically fundamental description of a Turing machine should have
an inherent definition for any numerical quantity which is of physical rele-
vance and can be explicitly defined (be it in arithmetic or geometric terms).
Remember that the concept of a Turing machine, though a purely mathe-
matical concept on first sight, has a physical ingredient. In its classical form
the concept implicitly assumes that the machine is working according to the
rules of classical mechanics (as was pointed out by Deutsch in [Deu]). But
- as we know definitely to be true nowdays from the existence of quantum
computers (though still very small in terms of bits, they exist) - this, indeed,
need not be the case and there are different, physically more fundamental,
concepts of a Turing machine than the classical one. Principle 2 assumes that
on a fundamental level everything is accessible to (the corresponding notion
of) digital computers, there are no phenomena which are fundamentally of an
“analog” nature (to stress it once again, the principle does in no way imply
that this should hold for classical Turing machines).
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We can immediately see that a classical Turing machine does not sat-
isfy Principle 2 because only the rational numbers Q are inherently defined
quantities for a classical Turing machine. But as the Pythagoreans observed
already, there are other numbers like
√
2 which can equally well be explicitly
defined (e.g. as representing the diagonal in a square of unit length). It
is not important that by the atomistic nature of matter no true diagonals
of true squares can be built. In all the physical theories known so far such
geometric constructs still appear on a more abstract level (e.g. in the setting
of state space). E.g.
√
2 can also be defined via normalization of an equal
probability superposition of two quantum states. So, we do not escape these
quantities by refering to atomism.
All algebraic numbers Q have an explicit definition (either one refers to
the corresponding algebraic equation or to a geometrical construction) but
still this is not sufficient. Volumes of explicitly defined geometrical figures are
also quantities we should include. Since - by the foregoing considerations - we
should consider a geometrical figure to be explicitly defined if its boundaries
can be defined in algebraic terms, this means that we should include integrals
over algebraic functions on algebraic domains. But if one puts this into
precise mathematical terms it means that periods should have an inherent
definition in fundamental computing devices.
We should remember at this point that we have to apply Principle 1,
too. Assuming the validity of the partly conjectural scenario of [Kon 1999]
(which includes especially the Deligne conjecture), it seems that only the
periods belonging to the algebra PZ,Tate are linked to the deformation theory
of associative algebras. So, both principles taken together do indeed suggest
the algebra PZ,Tate as the algebra of numbers which a physically fundamental
Turing machine should have an inherent definition of.
We are done then in suggesting a way how to define a quantum computer
from first principles without presupposing quantum mechanics from the start.
We could use this definition of a “fundamental Turing machine” now to
go back and reformulate the principle suggested above for string theory by
replacing the notion of a quantum computer by that of a “fundamental Turing
machine” (if one wants to have an equivalent formulation of this principle
which does not presuppose any conventional knowledge of quantization).
What does such an approach to quantization mean? It means that one
tries to understand quantization itself as being largely determined by a com-
putability requirement. We try to pass from simply observing the fact that
nature is intelligible (“the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the
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natural sciences” which nowdays can be refined to the statement of an un-
reasonable effectiveness of computer simulation) to turning this observation
into a fundamental physical principle. Only detailed future investigations
of the mathematical structures arising can lead to a judgement if such an
approach has a chance to lead to correct physics.
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